Pahalgam fallout: Why Xi Jinping may not come to rescue of 'China's Israel'

It’s said to be “higher than the Himalayas and deeper than the seas.” They also claim to be “all-weather friends.” General Xiong Guangkai, former intelligence chief of the PLA, reportedly called Pakistan “China’s Israel” during a meeting with his US counterparts.

But adjectives apart, how far will President Xi Jinping go to help Pakistan if India opts for a kinetic military response to avenge the Pahalgam terror attack? Will Xi be willing to commit forces or be just limited to issuing diplomatic statements?

Driving the news

In the wake of the Pahalgam terror attack, China has voiced support for Pakistan, calling for an “impartial” investigation while backing Islamabad’s “legitimate security concerns.”

Chinese foreign minister Wang Yi’s comments reveal Beijing’s cautious posture: “Conflict is not in the fundamental interests of either India or Pakistan," he told Pakistan’s deputy PM Ishaq Dar, calling for both sides to "exercise restraint".

In parallel, China and Pakistan worked behind closed doors to dilute the UN Security Council’s condemnation of the Pahalgam attack. Unlike the strong Pulwama statement in 2019, the UNSC statement after Pahalgam conspicuously avoided direct support for India’s investigation.

But a deeper look reveals a sharp limit to how far President Xi Jinping may be willing to go - exposing a hard truth: Pakistan, famously called "China’s Israel," cannot count on Beijing for unconditional support.

Munir’s (mis)calculations?

• Pakistan army chief general Asim Munir , whose past includes overseeing ISI operations during the 2019 Pulwama attack, likely believed a Kashmir-related escalation could serve as a distraction and unifier.
• For Munir, the Pahalgam attack may have seemed tactically smart. The domestic context is grim: A tanking economy, a jailed former prime minister, and a populace deeply hostile to the army’s political overreach.
• Munir may have also calculated that international dynamics have shifted in Pakistan's favour. The world is consumed by Gaza, Ukraine, and Taiwan. America is distracted enough by Trump tantrums. Gulf states are recalibrating too. Then there is China: Islamabad can always count on Beijing to bail it out from difficult situations.

Zoom in: Taliban handled, CPEC unraveled

Pakistan’s strategic value to China hinges on three pillars: Access to Afghanistan, infrastructure leverage through the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), and military containment of India.

All three have weakened.

• First, the Taliban. China has now built a direct relationship with the Afghan regime, bypassing Islamabad. It no longer needs Pakistan to manage Kabul.
• Second, the CPEC. Once marketed as the crown jewel of the Belt and Road Initiative, it is now viewed within Chinese policymaking circles as an expensive liability. Gwadar port-a planned rival to Dubai-remains underdeveloped, marred by insurgency, local resentment, and unpaid contractors. A project meant to showcase China’s global ambition now reflects its limitations.
• Third, military leverage. Pakistan’s utility in bottling up Indian strategic bandwidth remains, but the cost of association with an increasingly unstable, militarized regime-where jihadist linkages bleed into state structures-is rising.
• What Beijing may fear most isn’t Indian retaliation. It’s spillover. Particularly in Xinjiang, where it has spent decades crushing Islamist extremism. The Talibanization of Pakistan’s security apparatus is a red flag, not a rallying cry.

Ghosts of 1971: The original abandonment

Pakistan’s faith in Chinese military support dates back decades—often more as myth than reality. During the 1971 Indo-Pak war that led to the creation of Bangladesh, Islamabad waited in vain for a Chinese military intervention. It never came.

As per Andrew Small's China-Pakistan Axis, a Dawn editorial published in 1972 offered a sobering post-mortem: “Had we not presumed that we would get unlimited Chinese support, regardless of our objectives and conduct, the country might have been saved from humiliation and defeat.”

The pattern hasn’t changed much since. Beijing offers diplomatic cover, economic leverage, and strategic coordination-but not kinetic intervention. Not then, maybe not now.

Military comparison

Since the attack, the militaries of India and Pakistan have exchanged sporadic gunfire along the disputed Line of Control (LoC), and diplomatic relations have deteriorated sharply, raising fears of a broader conflict between the nuclear-armed neighbors.


The military imbalance between India and Pakistan is stark, with India’s conventional forces and defense budget far outstripping Pakistan’s.



This disparity has pushed Pakistan to rely more on asymmetric strategies, including its nuclear deterrent, to offset India’s superiority.

Between the lines

China’s reluctance is rooted in cold strategic math:

• PLA instability: Xi’s ongoing military purges have destabilized China's armed forces at the top. Over a dozen generals, including the heads of China’s nuclear and missile commands, have been removed. Confidence in the PLA’s combat readiness is at its lowest in a decade.
• Internal turbulence: Xi Jinping faces a fragile domestic scene — purging the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), battling an export slowdown, and trying to ensure his political survival ahead of the 2027 party congress.
• Trade war pressures: China’s economy is reeling under a trade war with the US, slowing growth and fragile consumer sentiment. Xi is wary of fueling regional instability that could further rattle markets.
• India matters more: Amid Donald Trump's tariff war, economic headwinds, and political churn, China seeks to cool tensions with India. After the deadly 2020 Ladakh clash, Beijing has quietly disengaged and de-escalated, recognizing India’s vital role in its regional strategy.
• Taiwan vs South Asia: Beijing’s urgent focus is Taiwan, the South China Sea, and strengthening economic partnerships in Southeast Asia. South Asia, despite its strategic significance, is secondary right now.

The bottom line

India's measured fury: India has already taken a series of measures, including the suspension of the Indus Water Treaty. This is a first; it has never happened since the signing of the treaty. PM Modi, in a high-profile security meeting, has given a carte blanche to security forces to determine their response as per their time, mode, and place of choosing.

Pakistan’s gamble: Munir, already facing internal collapse, may have miscalculated the global mood. If he was betting on China to shield Pakistan diplomatically after Pahalgam, it may prove to be a strategic blunder.

China's balancing act: Expect Beijing to continue verbal support for Pakistan while quietly urging restraint. For now, stabilizing ties with India and focusing on internal consolidation may matter more to Xi than any romantic notions of brotherhood with Pakistan.
(With inputs from agencies)